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This paper explores microdata from Argentine household surveys to analyze how 
changes in the enforcement of labor regulations affect the compliance level and other 
labor outcomes among men and women. Using information of the highly decentralized 
labor inspection system in Argentina, I construct an enforcement measure with variation 
at the province, sector and time level (share of inspected firms) which I instrument using 
a measure of the arrival cost of labor inspectors to the firms. The main findings reveal 
that when enforcement increases, the compliance with mandated benefits and formal 
wages increase among men, while informal wages decline. Among women, the 
compliance level declines jointly with informal wages. These heterogenous impacts are 
explained by labor regulations that make formal and informal men more substitutable in 
the production process than formal and informal women.  
 
Keywords: enforcement of labor regulations, compliance with labor regulations, gender, 
Argentina. 
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1. Introduction 
In Argentina, labor market regulations are extensive and the social security system has a de jure 
universal coverage. Most workers’ rights are established in the National Constitution, while labor 
relationships are regulated by different laws. However, as in most developing countries, 
compliance with labor regulations is low in Argentina. According to workers’ report on their 
own working conditions, in 2015 around 31% of wage employees did not receive pension 
contributions, health insurance, the annual extra monthly pay, and were not entitled to paid 
vacation time (SEDLAC, 2017). These figures suggest that there is a large difference between 
the written regulations and its effective implementation in the country.  
Strict labor regulations jointly with an imperfect enforcement can generate incentives to the 
firms for not complying with the labor law (Basu et al., 2010). That will depend on firms’ 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of evading the regulations (the expected monetary fine versus 
reduced labor costs). When the compliance with labor regulations is low, the enforcement of the 
rules becomes a concept that is closer to the regulatory environment that firms and workers face 
(Almeida and Carneiro, 2009). Therefore, firms are expected to react to variations in the 
enforcement level, even when the written regulation does not change. 
In this paper I explore microdata from Argentine household surveys for the period 2005-
2011 to analyze (i) how changes in the enforcement of labor market regulations affect different 
indicators of compliance with the labor law among men and women, and (ii) how changes in 
enforcement generates adjustments of some labor outcomes (different than the compliance level) 
for men and women separately. I take advantage of the highly decentralized labor inspection 
system in Argentina which allows me to construct an enforcement measure (number of inspected 
firms per hundred formal firms) with variation at the province, productive sector, and time level. 
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The econometric strategy links indicators of compliance with labor regulations and other labor 
market outcomes such as hourly wages, percentiles of the wage distribution, indicators of the 
provision of non-mandated benefits, and the structure of occupation by employment categories 
(wage employment versus self-employment), with the enforcement measure and with a rich set 
of individual socioeconomic and labor characteristics, and economic, institutional and 
development characteristics of Argentine provinces. 
The mechanisms analyzed in this paper are the following. When formal firms face stricter 
enforcement, the cost of not complying with labor regulations becomes higher. The increased 
cost of informal employment, i.e., workers not receiving mandated benefits, leads firms to 
comply with the rules by substituting formal employees for informal employees (substitution 
effect) and to reduce the size of the labor force (scale effect). The increased compliance may 
impact men and women differently. First, labor regulations usually present some differences 
across gender, and that is the case in Argentina. Second, differences in some labor 
characteristics, such as average monthly earnings, may lead firms to avoid labor regulation 
among women more than men or the other way around. Adjustments in the size of the labor force 
may also have a different impact on men and women. Firms may prefer to lay off women more 
than men because their severance pay will be lower, i.e., women’s average tenure and monthly 
earnings are usually lower in comparison to men. An additional impact associated with the scale 
effect is that workers who lose their jobs may offer their hours of work to informal firms. This 
effect is possible because labor inspections are focused on formal firms in Argentina. The 
increased labor costs resulting from stricter enforcement can lead firms to make additional 
adjustments which can also differ among men and women. They can reduce hourly wages or 
decrease the level of non-mandated benefits, such as meals and housing.  
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The main challenge to the estimation of the relationships of interest is that the enforcement 
measure is probably endogenous. To deal with this problem, I implement an instrumental 
variable strategy. The proposed instrument is a measure of the arrival cost of labor inspectors to 
the firms. Labor inspectors travel by car from the inspection agencies to the firms to be 
inspected. A combination of the extension of the road network and the traffic in each province 
provides a measure of the arrival cost to the firms.  
Results reveal very different effects of an increase in the degree of enforcement on the 
compliance level and other labor market outcomes among men and women. Higher enforcement 
leads firms to increase compliance with labor regulation among men. The shares of male wage 
employees covered by social security (pensions and health insurance) and employment 
regulations (annual extra monthly wage, paid vacation time, paid sickdays, wage equal or above 
the minimum and working hours equal or below the legal maximum) increase at the province-
sector level, i.e., firms substitute formal wage employees for informal wage employees. Formal 
wages increase, informal wages decline, and self-employed men become wage earners to take 
advantage of the increase in the provision of mandated benefits. Among women, higher 
enforcement leads to a reduction in the provision of mandated benefits at the province-sector 
level. The scale effect dominates among them, and the decline in formal firms’ demand for 
formal and informal female wage employees leads to formal and informal wage reductions for 
women (although not significant for formal wages). Laid-off women move to informal firms 
where do not receive mandated benefits and self-employed women become informal wage 
employees, probably attracted by the probability of obtaining better employment conditions in 
the future due to higher enforcement. All these findings are in line with the functioning of a two-
sector economy model with competitive markets and no rigidities.   
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The topic of gender differences in the analysis of labor market regulations is of clear 
importance for both developed and developing countries. I focus the empirical work on 
Argentina for three reasons. First, the availability of data allows me to construct a measure of 
enforcement with variation across provinces, sectors, and overtime for the period 2005-2011, 
when there is also microdata at the individual level on a wide set of mandated benefits for wage 
employees, some non-mandated benefits and hourly wages. With this data, I can test for men and 
women how the compliance with labor regulations reacts when the enforcement measure 
changes, and how other labor outcomes respond, probably due to firms’ need of adjustment. 
Second, the fact that the labor rules being enforced are common to all Argentine provinces 
generates an ideal framework to evaluate the effects of changes in the enforcement measure on 
labor outcomes using the province variation of the data. Third, equality of opportunities between 
men and women has been placed at the top of the policy agenda in recent years. The elimination 
of any type of violence against women, including the discrimination at the workplace, has been 
part of Argentine Congress meetings which is discussing laws in that direction.  
This paper makes important contributions to the literature analyzing heterogeneous labor 
market effects of labor regulations across gender, and to the literature studying the effects of 
enforcement of the labor law (not the law by itself) on labor outcomes. First, to my knowledge, 
there is no evidence linking the enforcement of labor regulations to labor outcomes of men and 
women, or using simultaneously the variation of an enforcement measure across geographic 
locations, economic sectors and over time. Second, the results provide evidence on how the 
regulatory environment can impact the decisions that firms and workers make about participating 
in the informal sector of the economy. Finally, the empirical findings have important policy 
implications in terms of gender equality in the labor market. 
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature while Section 3 
provides a description of the labor inspection system in Argentina. Section 4 discusses the 
theoretical mechanisms at play in the estimation of the relationship between enforcement of 
labor regulations and labor market outcomes for men and women. Section 5 presents the 
empirical strategy while Sections 6 and 7 discuss the results. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This paper relates to three important literatures. First, this paper is related to studies analyzing 
the impacts of labor regulations on labor market outcomes in a broad sense, i.e. level of 
compliance with the labor law and other labor outcomes, in a within-country context. These 
studies have found that stricter labor regulations are associated with reductions in output, 
employment, investment, and productivity in the formal sector, declines in job turnover, and 
output increases in the informal sector (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Mondino and Montoya, 2004; 
Kugler, 2004; Micco and Pagés, 2006). From this strand of literature, this paper is closely related 
to studies looking at heterogeneous impacts for different population groups. The evidence is not 
conclusive when it comes to gender differences. Betcherman (2013) provides a detailed survey 
on the effects of labor regulations on labor market outcomes for men and women. The within-
country findings show that stricter job security regulations lead to a reduction in the probability 
of employment of women relative to men and a movement out of wage employment and into 
self-employment (Montenegro and Pagés, 2004), and lower reductions in earning for women 
than men (Mondino and Montoya, 2004). For the maternity leave specifically, the findings 
indicate that there is a wage penalty for women depending on the length of the leave (Gindling 
and Crummett, 1997). Regarding the minimum wage legislation, most studies have found a 
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negative employment effect among adult women (Feliciano, 1998; Arango and Pachon, 2004), 
with the exception of Montenegro and Pagés (2004), who found that women benefit from 
minimum wage policies, especially the young. Finally, unions and collective bargaining lead to a 
positive effect on wages which is larger for women than men (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002), and to 
larger increases in male unemployment than female unemployment when collective bargaining 
are more decentralized (Feldmann, 2009). 
Second, this paper is related to the literature analyzing the relationship between enforcement 
of labor regulations and labor market outcomes. The large gap between the written regulations 
and the level of compliance has led to the emergence of studies emphasizing the importance of 
enforcement of the labor law. These studies use the variation in the enforcement of labor 
regulations rather than or in addition to changes in the regulation itself to identify effects on 
labor outcomes. Within country studies have concluded that higher enforcement of the labor law 
reduces firms’ size and possibly productivity (Almeida and Carneiro, 2009), decreases job 
creation and increases job destruction (Almeida and Poole, 2017), increases the compliance with 
labor market regulations (Ronconi, 2010; Almeida et al., 2013) or does not have any effect on it 
(Bhorat et al., 2012; Viollaz, 2018), increases formal employment and non-employment, reduces 
informal employment, leads to a fall in formal wages at the top of the wage distribution and to 
informal wages increases (Almeida and Carneiro, 2012), and reduces de provision of non-
mandated benefits (Almeida et al., 2013).  
 Third, this paper relates to the literature linking labor regulations and taxes to the size of the 
informal sector (de Soto, 1989; de Paula and Scheinkman, 2006), directly or indirectly through 
the effect of enforcement (Loayza et al. 2005). Inside the literature on labor informality, this 
paper is also close to studies conceptualizing the informal sector as a non-homogenous sector, 
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where easy entry and low wage activities coexist with other activities that have barriers to entry, 
and where the linkages of these two types of activities with the formal sector is very different 
(Fields, 2005). 
 
3. Labor regulations and labor inspections in Argentina 
3.1. Labor regulations and workers’ rights 
In Argentina, most workers’ rights are established in the National Constitution and labor 
relationships are regulated by different laws. Wage employees who are registered in the formal 
register of labor relationships are entitled to several benefits including, among others, a 
minimum monthly wage, an annual extra monthly wage, paid vacation time, a maximum of 8 
working hours a day and 48 hours a week, retirement and health insurance benefits, a paid 
maternity leave of 90 days and a paternity leave of two days, advance notice and severance 
payment, family allowances, and unemployment insurance. 
The level of compliance with labor market regulations is far from perfect in Argentina. 
During the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, the percentage of wage employees who 
received legally mandated benefits fell systematically for both men and women (Figure 1). This 
was a period characterized by a gradual process of agreement between workers’ unions and 
employers with the objective of increasing the flexibility in labor relationships. Since 2003 the 
percentage of wage employees receiving mandated benefits showed a positive trend reaching 
more than 60% of coverage in 2015. This pattern was probably related to the better performance 
of the economy and also to changes in the labor inspection system through the Labor Regulation 
Law passed in 2004 (MTEySS, 2013). Along the entire period depicted in the figure, the 
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percentages of male wage employees covered by social security or employment benefits were 
always above the percentages for women. 
3.2. Labor inspection system 
The Labor Regulation Law of 2004 set up the Labor Inspection System, or LIS for short, with 
the objective of monitoring the compliance with labor and social security regulations.1 This 
system intends to guarantee the labor rights established in the National Constitution and 
international labor agreements supported by Argentina. The law establishes a shared faculty to 
exert control and assess the compliance with labor laws between the National Ministry of Labor, 
the 23 provinces, and the Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires (CABA), which is the capital of the 
country and an autonomous district.2  
 Labor inspections are decentralized in 39 local inspection agencies which are spread 
throughout the country and grouped in seven regional agencies. Each province has at least one 
local inspection agency in its jurisdiction and their functions extend only to each province’s 
territory.3  
Every quarter regional agencies receive recommendations from the National Ministry of 
Labor regarding the activities and areas where the inspections should be focused. Regional 
agencies jointly with local inspection agencies organize the inspection activities geographically 
and by economic sector according to the recommendations received, the availability of resources, 
and past experience. Since the implementation of the LIS, local inspection agencies have learnt 
about the activities operating in their jurisdictions, the amount of workers participating in these 
                                                          
1 The labor inspection system introduced by the law is also known as National Plan of Labor Regularization which 
was active during the period analyzed in this paper. 
2 I will consider CABA as an additional province throughout the study. 
3 Buenos Aires province has 10 local inspection agencies, Río Negro has three, Chubut, Entre Ríos, Mendoza, Santa 
Cruz, and Santa Fe have two, while the remaining 17 provinces have one local inspection agency. The number of 
local inspection agencies did not change during the period covered in this study. 
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sectors, and the seasons of more activity, allowing the adjustment of the inspection’s plans. In 
fact, the detection of non-registered workers increased since 2005 despite the general reduction 
in the number of inspected firms (Figure 2) (MTEySS, 2013).  
Labor inspections are focused on formal firms in expansionary economic activities that have 
contributory capacity in order to avoid the penalties to go to weaker sectors (MTEySS, 2013).4 In 
order to reduce inspectors’ opportunities to select the firms in a discretionary manner, they 
receive clear instructions from the local agencies about the number of firms and workers to 
assess and the number of non-registered workers to detect. Inspectors travel from the local 
agency to the firms to be inspected by car. Since the creation of the LIS, local and regional 
agencies have received vehicles (cars and vans) easing the inspection activities.  
The violations of labor regulations are classified according to their severity –there are minor, 
serious and very serious violations. When a situation of non-compliance with the law is detected, 
a case file is opened and the employer has the opportunity to present evidence in its defense. 
With this information and the result of a second inspection, the Resolution Office determines if 
the employer should be penalized. The penalties consist of economic fines, which amount 
depends on the severity of the violation, and the close down of the firm in case of reoccurrence 
of very serious violations. If the employer solves the irregularity by the moment of the 
deposition, the amount of the penalty is reduced.  
3.3.   Enforcement of labor regulations  
The measure of enforcement of labor market regulations in this paper is the number of inspected 
firms per hundred formal firms in each of the 24 provinces, 10 productive sectors and year, from 
2005 to 2011. Enforcement is expected to vary at the province and sector level since labor 
                                                          
4 According to the functioning of the labor inspection system in Argentina, a firm is formal (and it is a target of labor 
inspections) if it has declared at least one employee in the registration system. 
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inspections are planned by the local inspection agencies considering the productive structure of 
local economies, the number of workers participating in the main activities and their seasonality, 
among other factors. 
Institutional and development factors can also play a role. In certain provinces, labor 
inspectors could be more prone to participate in dishonest deals. There is evidence on reports 
against labor inspectors who ask for money in exchange for not inspecting certain firms. The 
evidence also points out different “patterns” of enforcement across provinces. For example, 
inspectors in Córdoba are highly dependent on labor unions, while in CABA they rely on non-
union civil organizations for enforcement (Amengual, 2014). This evidence indicates that 
institutional and development characteristics of the provinces are close determinants of the 
enforcement level, and probably of the level of compliance with labor regulations as well. 
Figure 2 reports the time series of some variables related to the inspection system between 
2005 and 2011. Panels (a) and (b) show, for the country as a whole, the number of inspected 
firms and the number of inspected firms per hundred formal firms respectively. Both variables 
present the same overall pattern, with a reduction over time, especially between 2006 and 2011. 
As mentioned in the previous section, since the Labor Regulation Law, inspections have been 
adjusted using information from past experiences in order to achieve the same number of non-
registered workers through the inspection of fewer firms (MTEySS, 2013). This can be seen in 
Panel (c), which shows the increase over time in the number of non-registered workers detected 
as a percentage of the total number of inspected workers.  
Figure 3 shows the variation in the measure of enforcement across provinces, sectors and 
over time. Panels (a) and (b) present changes in the enforcement level between some selected 
consecutive years for each of the 24 provinces and 10 sectors respectively. The figure shows an 
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important degree of variability in enforcement changes both across provinces and sectors. In 
some years the enforcement measure increased in most provinces and sectors although with 
different intensity across them, e.g. 2005-2006, while in some others it decreased, e.g. 2007-
2008. Figure 3 also shows that there is no association between the annual changes in the 
enforcement measure and the initial structure of employment by gender (Panel c) and its annual 
changes (Panel d).  
 
4. Theoretical mechanisms 
I consider a representative profit maximizing formal firm which operates in a two-sector 
economy with competitive markets and no rigidities and chooses the number of male and female 
employees given a set of factors such as technology and capital stock. In a context of imperfect 
enforcement, the firm can decide to comply with labor regulations or to evade them. As a result, 
the firm chooses how many of four imperfect substitute-types of workers to hire: formal men, 
informal men, formal women, informal women. Formal employees receive mandated benefits, 
while informal employees do not. 
When enforcement becomes stricter (labor inspections increase as a percentage of the total 
number of formal firms), the cost of not complying with labor regulations increases for the firm: 
the probability of being detected and penalized becomes higher. The increased cost of informal 
employment leads the firm to: (i) comply with the rules by substituting formal employees for 
informal employees (substitution effect), and (ii) reduce the level of production and the size of 
the labor force (scale effect) (Micco and Pagés, 2006; Almeida and Carneiro, 2009). 
The increase in compliance (substitution effect) may impact men and women differently. 
Firms may prefer to increase the level of compliance among women because some labor 
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regulations are cheaper for them. For instance, the contributions to the pension and health 
insurance systems tend to be lower among women as they are a percentage of monthly earnings. 
On the other hand, firms may prefer to increase the level of compliance among men because 
women usually enjoy a longer maternity leave. 
Adjustments in the size of the labor force (scale effect) may also impact men and women 
differently. The decline in women employment can be larger than the decline for men (given a 
reduction in labor demand) due to the larger female labor supply elasticity (Montenegro and 
Pagés, 2004). Firms may also prefer to lay off women more than men because their severance 
pay will be lower, i.e., women tend to receive lower monthly earnings and have lower average 
tenure in comparison to men (for a given age).5 On the other hand, firms may prefer to have 
more women than men in their labor force because their higher turnover rates imply that women 
will probably quit before attaining a high level of tenure, reducing future severance payment 
costs (Pagés and Montenegro, 1999).  
An additional impact associated with the scale effect is that workers who lose their jobs may 
offer their hours of work to informal firms which are not inspected. The shift in employment 
towards informal firms may depend on workers’ valuation of the mandated benefits being 
enforced (Almeida and Carneiro, 2012; Almeida et al., 2013). Considering women as secondary 
workers, they are expected to accept a job without mandated benefits more than men, because 
the gain from these benefits is lower if another member of the household already has them, i.e. 
their husbands (Galiani and Weinschelbaum, 2012). Because the household survey data of 
Argentina does not contain information on the formality status of the firm where each person is 
                                                          
5 Severance pay in Argentina is calculated as one monthly earning per year of tenure in the firm considering the best 
monthly earning received. 
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employed, this impact cannot be tested directly.6 However, if the share of wage employees 
receiving mandated benefits at the province-sector level falls with an increase in enforcement, 
that will be interpreted as an expansion of employment in informal firms (which are not a target 
of labor inspections). The reasoning follows the expected reaction of firms when faced with an 
increase in enforcement. Formal firms that were not complying with all or some dimensions of 
the mandated benefits for some of their workers are expected to increase the level of compliance, 
but never to decrease it (substitution effect). Firms can also reduce the size of the labor force. 
Laid-off workers are the ones who may offer their hours of work to informal firms.  
Reductions in firms’ size may induce changes in the composition of employment by employment 
category as well. On the one hand, laid-off workers may switch from being wage employees to 
self-employment. On the other hand, a higher compliance level may increase wage employment 
which is now more attractive.    
 Higher labor costs resulting from an increase in compliance can lead firms to make an 
additional adjustment. Firms can switch to a capital-intensive technology avoiding the increase 
in labor costs and the reduction in the production level (Loayza, 1996).7 The level of investment 
and labor productivity can also be negatively affected (Besley and Burgess, 2004). Firms can 
also adjust by affecting some job attributes. They can reduce hourly wages or the provision of 
non-mandated benefits, such as meals and housing. Reductions in hourly wages can affect 
women more than men because women can be considered “outsiders” with less bargaining 
power and less negotiating abilities (Montenegro and Pagés, 2004). However, the final effect on 
hourly wages will also depend on the reallocation of workers between the formal and informal 
                                                          
6 The Argentine household survey contains information on whether wage employees receive mandated benefits or 
not. Wage employees receiving benefits are employed in formal firms. Wage employees not receiving mandated 
benefits can be employed in a formal or an informal firm. 
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sectors of the economy. Reductions in the provision of non-mandated benefits such as food and 
housing are also expected. This set of benefits should be easier to adjust for firms if they are 
provided voluntarily. However, if the provision of non-mandated benefits consists of an in-kind 
part of the monthly pay, the expected effect of an increase in enforcement is not clear. Firms may 
prefer to increase in-kind payments as that will provide them with more liquidity to face the 
increase in labor costs.8 
 
5. Empirical strategy 
I use information from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares Continua, Argentine household 
survey, from 2005 to 2011 where wage employees report their own working conditions. I 
perform the analysis separately for men and women. The sample of men includes men aged 16 to 
65 (legislated retirement age for men), while the sample of women includes those aged 16 to 60 
(legislated retirement age for women). The sample comprises wage employees from the private 
sector who are employed in the productive sectors inspected by the LIS.  
 Table 1 presents some sample statistics for the main variables used, while the Appendix 
provides details on variables definition. Men and women in the sample have almost the same age 
on average (36 years), women are more educated that men (2 more years of education) and have 
a higher coverage of social security and employment benefits than men.9 Around 69% of women 
enjoy social security coverage, while the figure is 62% for men. The gender difference is larger 
when analyzing the coverage of employment regulations: 48% for women and 36% for men. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 Because the probability of detection usually increases with the size of a firm (Almeida and Ronconi, 2016), firms 
may also want to reduce the number of employees as a way to reduce the chances of being inspected. 
8 Labor regulations in Argentina allow the payment of up to 20% of monthly earnings in products, food or housing. 
Social security contributions have to be calculated both on in-kind and in-cash payments. 
9 This pattern differs from results presented in Figure 1. The difference is explained by the exclusion of public sector 
employees and domestic service workers from the sample used in this section. 
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Men receive non-mandated benefits (housing, meals and products) with a higher probability than 
women. Men tend to work more in small firms, and in agriculture and manufacturing sectors in 
comparison to women. Women receive higher hourly wages than men regardless their formality 
status, i.e., whether they receive mandated benefits or not, but monthly labor earning are higher 
for men.  
 The main specification regresses different measures of compliance with labor market 
regulations and other labor outcomes for individual i, in province p, in productive sector s, and 
year t (      in equation (1)) on the measure of enforcement for province p, productive sector s, 
and year t, which is defined as the logarithm of the number of inspected firms per hundred 
formal firms (    ). 
                                                       . (1) 
The outcome variables considered in the analysis are: (i) an indicator variable of compliance 
with social security regulations (equal to one if the wage employee receives contributions to the 
pension and health insurance systems), (ii) an indicator of compliance with employment 
regulations (equal to one if the wage employee receives paid vacations, annual extra monthly 
wage, paid sick days, earns at list the minimum wage, and works no more than the maximum of 
weekly hours), (iii) other labor outcomes such as hourly wages, percentiles of the hourly wage 
distribution, non-mandated benefits (indicators of housing, food, and other products), (iv) and an 
indicator of wage employment where self-employment is the omitted category. The individual 
characteristics included as control variables (      in equation (1)) are age and age squared, 
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indicators for educational level, marital status, size of the firm where individual i is employed, 
and the number of children at home.10   
Several variables at the province level with variation over time are included in different 
specifications to control for characteristics that can be correlated with the level of enforcement 
and can affect the level of compliance as well (    in equation (1)). These variables include: the 
logarithm of social per capita expenditure and the primary result (total incomes minus primary 
expenditures) as a percentage of total incomes. These controls are justified by the heterogeneous 
political business cycles of the provinces (Piore and Schrank, 2008; Murillo et al., 2011; 
Ronconi, 2012); the logarithm of the percentage of absenteeism in provincial elections. This 
variable intends to control for the quality of provincial institutions; the logarithm of the 
population, the logarithm of per capita household income, the unsatisfied basic needs poverty 
indicator, and the logarithm of building permits per capita. These variables capture the 
provinces’ development level (first three variables), and control for demand shocks (last 
variable). All the specifications include province, sector and year fixed effects (  ,   , and    in 
equation (1)), while one of the specifications also adds province-specific time trends (     , 
where    is a categorical variable). The standard errors are clustered at the province and sector 
level.  
 There are reasons to believe that      is correlated with the error term in equation (1). First, 
a low level of compliance with labor regulations can result in a higher level of enforcement. 
Second, the enforcement level can be correlated with unobserved institutional and development 
time-varying characteristics at the province level (not captured by the province fixed effects or 
                                                          
10 The questionnaire allows me to identify persons who work in a different province from where they live. With this 
information, I reassigned these people to the province where they work, so they can be affected by the enforcement 
level of that province. 
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province-specific time trends), generating a spurious correlation with compliance. To address 
these issues, I implement an instrumental variable strategy. The proposed instrument is a 
measure of the arrival cost of labor inspectors to the firms. Labor inspectors travel by car from a 
local inspection agency in province p to the firms to be inspected in the same province. The 
extension of the road network in each province provides a measure of the arrival cost to the 
firms. With a wider network, a higher geographic dispersion of firms is expected, increasing the 
arrival cost in terms of money and time.11 The arrival cost is also affected by the traffic in the 
road network in each province. A larger number of vehicles is expected to increase the cost. The 
instrumental variable is defined as follows: 
                          
   . (2) 
The variable      is the extension of the province road network (national plus provincial roads) 
in kilometers divided by the province territory. This variable differs greatly between provinces, 
but the variation over time is small. The variable     measures the traffic in the province road 
network as the number of per capita crossing vehicles in province p and year t. The arrival cost is 
defined as the logarithm of the number of per capita crossing vehicles per kilometer of the ratio 
territory-province roads. In order to add variation at the sector level, I multiplied this measure by 
the share of each sector in the total gross production value in 2004. The reasoning is that labor 
inspections are focused on expansionary activities. Considering that a higher share of the gross 
production value is probably associated with a higher level of compliance, I predetermined the 
share using data of 2004.  
                                                          
11 Local inspection agencies are based in the main cities of each province (e.g. capital city) where a large share of 
firms is probably located. A measure of the geographic dispersion of firms in each province’s territory would 
improve the instrument as an arrival cost measure. However, the lack of that information does not affect the validity 
of the instrument. 
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One may argue that the extension of the province road network is capturing the level of 
development of each province, generating a violation to the exclusion restriction of the 
instrument. A wider road network eases the access to the main province markets, allowing cities 
which are further away from them to obtain products they would not have obtained otherwise.12 
Thus, the key to the relationship between the extension of road networks and the development of 
the provinces is the distance separating remote locations from the main markets, i.e. the capital 
or other main cities. Given that the extension of road networks is essentially unchanged in my 
data, this effect will be captured by the province fixed effects. If some extension of the road 
network is implemented with the passing of time, I expect to capture its possible correlation with 
the development level through the inclusion of province-specific time trends and other controls 
for provinces’ development level over time. A similar argument can be applied to the measure of 
traffic in province road networks.  
 Table 2 provides the first stage results for the samples of men and women and for different 
specifications. The measure of the arrival cost of labor inspectors is statistically significant in all 
specifications for the samples of men and women, and the estimates are remarkably stable across 
models. As expected, an increase in the measure of arrival cost reduces the degree of 
enforcement. Specifically, an increase of 1% in the arrival cost reduces the enforcement in 
around 0.86% for the sample of men and 0.67% for the sample of women. The Kleibergen-Paap 
F-statistic is above 10 for men in columns 2 and 3 and close to 10 for women, being 10 the rule 
of thumb for rejection of the hypothesis of having a weak instrument. The p-value of the 
underidentification test also allows the rejection of the hypothesis of having a weak instrument.  
 
6. Empirical results 
                                                          
12 Roads are the main option to connect geographic points in Argentina. Railroads are not widespread. 
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6.1. Enforcement of labor regulations, compliance with mandated benefits and hourly wages  
Table 3 presents the results of the model of compliance with social security and employment 
regulations regressed on the enforcement measure using the most complete specification. Results 
are shown separately for the samples of men and women. OLS estimations are also provided.  
 Column 1 presents IV estimates of the effect of enforcement on the compliance with social 
security regulations (the wage employee receives contributions to the pension and health 
insurance systems). The impact is positive for men. A 10% increase in the enforcement effort in 
the province and sector where a male wage employee is located leads to an increase of 1 
percentage point in the level of compliance. For the sample of women, the effect is negative and 
significant at 10% level. The share of female wage employees receiving social security 
contributions at the province-sector level falls 1.7 percentage points for each 10% increase in 
enforcement. The effect of the enforcement measure on each social security benefit analyzed 
separately is provided in the Appendix and indicates an increase in the compliance with each of 
them among men, and a reduction among women (Columns 1 and 2 of Table A2). 
Table 3-Column 3 shows the IV results when the dependent variable is the compliance with 
employment regulations (the wage employee receives paid vacations, annual extra monthly 
wage, paid sick days, earns at list the minimum wage, and works no more than the maximum of 
weekly hours). The effect is positive and statistically significant for men and indicates an 
increase of around 0.6 percentage points in the compliance with employment regulations for each 
10% increase in enforcement. The effect for women is negative and significant at 10% level. The 
magnitude indicates a reduction of 1.4 percentage points in the share of female wage earners 
receiving all employment benefits at the province-sector level for each 10% increase in 
enforcement. The impact on each employment benefit analyzed separately shows an increase in 
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the share of men and a reduction in the share of women receiving each of them, except for the 
not significant change in the maximum of weekly hours of work for men (Columns 3 to 7 of 
Table A2).  
The sign of OLS bias is not clear in theory. On the one hand, enforcement can be stricter in 
more developed provinces, where the level of compliance is also higher (positive bias). On the 
other hand, lobby groups may negotiate lower enforcement levels by showing high compliance 
rates (negative bias). OLS estimations in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 are smaller (in absolute 
value) compare to IV estimates, suggesting the presence of a negative bias for men and a positive 
bias for women. However, OLS estimates are not statistically significant in any case.  
The negative impacts of a higher level of enforcement on the share of female wage 
employees that in each province-sector combination receives mandated benefits are statistically 
weak but suggests a reallocation of women to informal firms, probably after being laid-off from 
formal firms.13 These findings are in line with women having a low valuation of some mandated 
benefits, especially the health insurance, which they can obtain through other members of their 
family. Table 4 provides suggestive evidence in favor of this argument by splitting the sample 
according to marital status. Results indicate that when enforcement increases, the share of men 
receiving mandated benefits improves regardless their marital status (although the magnitudes of 
the impacts are larger among married men). Among women, the negative effects of a higher 
degree of enforcement appear only for married women. Despite this suggestive evidence, the 
movement to informal firms as a last resort option cannot be ruled out. 
How can these findings be interpreted in light of the theoretical discussion of Section 4? To 
help to interpret the results on the level of compliance, table 5 provides additional evidence on 
                                                          
13 Exit from the labor force could be another margin of adjustment. The variation of the enforcement data at the 
sector level does not allow me to link people out of the labor force with the enforcement measure. 
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the impact of enforcement on hourly wages and percentiles of the wage distribution. The sample 
is split according to the formality status of workers: wage employees receiving mandated 
benefits are formal workers, while wage earners not receiving them are informal workers. 
Results indicate that enforcement increases have a positive impact on average formal wages for 
men (an increase of about 0.5% for each 10% increase in enforcement) and no impact on average 
informal wages. For women, a higher level of enforcement reduces hourly wages of informal 
workers (reduction of 2.5% for each 10% increase in enforcement) with no effect on average 
formal wages.  
Columns 2-4 and 6-8 of Table 5 show the results obtained when the response variables are 
the 10th percentile of the distribution of the logarithm of formal and informal hourly wages in 
each province-sector, the 50th percentile and the 90th percentile respectively. Results show that 
formal hourly wages increase along the entire wage distribution for men, while there is a 
reduction at the 50th and 90th percentiles of the informal wage distribution. Among women, 
there is a reduction of informal hourly wages in the middle of the distribution and no changes of 
formal hourly wages. 
All these findings are consistent with the theoretical discussion of Section 4. When faced 
with an increase in enforcement, formal firms start complying with the rules they were evading 
(substitution effect). Firms increase the demand for formal employees (workers receiving 
mandated benefits) and reduce the demand for informal employees (workers with no benefits). 
The corresponding adjustment in wages is an increase in formal wages and a reduction in 
informal wages. An increase in formal wages at the bottom of the wage distribution is also 
expected if the compliance with the minimum wage regulation increases. All these adjustments 
are supported by the empirical findings for men, but they are at odds with the findings for 
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women. Among women, the effect of the reduction in the size of the labor force (scale effect) 
offsets any substitution of formal wage employees for informal wage employees. Some women 
are laid-off and the movement to an informal firm of those who were receiving mandated 
benefits explains the increase in informal employment (reduction in the share of women 
receiving mandated benefits), the reduction in formal wages (although not significant) and the 
reduction in informal wages. All these empirical findings can also be interpreted in light of 
models with labor market frictions, such as efficiency wages and search models, where labor 
demand increases lead to increases in wages even when there is unemployment (Albrecht et al., 
2009; Meghir et al., 2015).  
What explains the heterogenous adjustment across gender? Once I control for educational 
level and other individual characteristics, the difference between formal and informal wage 
employees, men or women, is the compliance with labor regulations. Labor regulations are such 
that formal and informal men have a higher degree of substitutability in the production process 
than formal and informal women. For instance, formal women enjoy a maternity leave and 
probably make more use of leaves for illness of a family member in comparison to informal 
women (and in comparison to men). Given these rules, it is less convenient for firms to substitute 
informal women with formal women than doing it among men. 
6.2. Enforcement of labor regulations, non-mandated benefits and composition of employment 
According to the theoretical discussion in Section 4, firms can look for an additional adjustment 
mechanism to compensate for the increased labor costs as a result of the higher level of 
enforcement. Table 6 presents the results obtained when the outcome variable is the provision of 
non-mandated benefits, such as meals at work, housing or products. Findings indicate that for 
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both men and women, the impact of a higher level of enforcement is very small in magnitude and 
not significant statistically in any of the estimated models.  
In Table 7, I analyze how the changes in the enforcement level across provinces, sectors and 
over time impact on the composition of employment between wage employment and self-
employment.14 For the sample of men, column 1 shows that increases in enforcement lead to 
increases in the share of wage employment in relation to self-employment. When separating 
wage employment in formal and informal (Columns 2 and 3), the findings reveal an increase in 
the shares of formal and informal wage employment in detriment of self-employment among 
men. One important question to interpret these findings is who the self-employed are. They could 
be persons working at the bottom of the job structure, hoping to get out of that employment 
category where entry is not restricted and earnings are low, or they could belong to a restricted-
entry category where a stock of financial and/or human capital is needed to enter and where 
earnings are high (Fields, 2005). The comparison of the educational level and earnings of self-
employed workers, formal and informal wage employees indicate that self-employed are similar 
to informal wage earners.15 Self-employment seems to be a non-desired employment category 
among men. The findings indicate that self-employed men are attracted by the higher chances of 
obtaining mandated benefits when working as wage employees and change their employment 
category. The increased labor supply in the formal sector should reduce hourly formal wages for 
men, but the increased demand due to the substitution effect seems to be offsetting that impact. 
When the higher demand for formal wage employees is satisfied, those self-employed who could 
                                                          
14 The average percentage of self-employed workers over the entire period was 14.3% for women and 20.1% for 
men. 
15 The average years of education for formal and informal wage employees is 11.5 and 9.6 respectively, and for self-
employed workers is 10.1. The average monthly earnings are $1291 for formal wage employees, $669 for informal 
wage employees, and $830 for self-employed workers. 
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not get a formal job obtain a position as wage employees in an informal firm, providing an 
additional explanation for the reduction in informal wages for men.  
For the sample of women, there is no significant impact of the enforcement measure on the 
chances of being a formal wage employee with respect to being a self-employed worker (Column 
2 of Table 7). This evidence indicates that women who were receiving mandated benefits and 
lose their jobs do not switch to self-employment, i.e., they move to informal firms where they 
continue being wage employees but without mandated benefits. Results also show an increase in 
the probability of informal wage employment with respect to self-employment (Column 3 of 
Table 7). Self-employed women try to obtain a job as wage employees when enforcement 
increases, even when the impact on women is a reduction in the coverage of mandated benefits. 
This result can be interpreted as the expectation of obtaining a formal position in the future. 
Because formal firms’ demand is falling both for formal and informal female wage employees 
(scale effect), self-employed women switch to wage employment in informal firms. 
 
7. Additional estimations 
7.1. Relocation decisions of firms 
A firm may decide to relocate when the share of inspected firms is increasing in its province-
sector. One determinant of firms’ location decisions is the distance to the main product and 
intermediate products markets which are probably located in the capital or some other main 
cities. These are the cities where the local inspection agencies are located in each province. If a 
firm decides to move further away from the inspection agencies, it will imply to move away 
from the main markets too. To control for this determinant of firms’ location decisions, I include 
a measure of transportation costs at the province level: retail oil price for each province and 
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year.16 IV estimations are shown in Tables 8 while first stage results are provided in Table A3 in 
the Appendix. Results for both men and women are in line with previous estimates.  
7.2. Number of labor inspection agencies in each province  
One may worry that the measure of the arrival cost of labor inspectors to the firms (instrumental 
variable) is overestimated in provinces having more than one local inspection agency. To capture 
this possibility, I redefine the instrumental variable dividing RNpt*Tpt by the number of local 
inspection agencies in each province. Results are presented in Table 9 and are in line with 
previous findings for men and women. 
7.3. Composition of employment by economic sector 
The heterogenous results for men and women may be reflecting the differential impact of labor 
regulations on the substitutability of formal and informal workers and also the fact that men and 
women are employed in different sectors. In order to check for this possibility, I re-weighted the 
sample of women to have the same distribution of employment by sector as the sample of men in 
each year. Results in Table 10 show that the reduction in the share of women receiving mandated 
benefits is still present using the re-weighted sample.  
 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, I explored how changes in the enforcement of labor regulations in Argentina affect 
different labor market indicators among men and women. Labor regulations are extensive in this 
country, but enforcement is imperfect, generating incentives to the firms for not complying with 
the labor rules. 
                                                          
16 The location decisions of firms would be better captured by characteristics of the cities where firms are located 
within each province. However, this level of geographical detail (city where the worker is employed) is not available 
in Argentine household surveys. 
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Taking advantage of the highly decentralized labor inspection system in Argentina, I 
constructed an enforcement measure (logarithm of the number of inspected firms per hundred 
formal firms) with variation at the province, sector, and time level. The econometric strategy 
linked indicators of compliance with labor regulations and other labor outcomes with the 
enforcement measure and with a rich set of individual characteristics, and economic, institutional 
and development characteristics of Argentine provinces. To deal with the possible endogeneity 
of the enforcement measure in this setting, I instrumented it using a measure of the arrival cost of 
labor inspectors to the firms.  
The findings revealed heterogenous effects of an increase in enforcement at the province-
sector level on compliance and other labor outcomes among men and women. Higher 
enforcement leads firms to substitute formal wage employees for informal wage employees 
among men. Formal wages increase, informal wages decline, and self-employed men become 
wage earners to take advantage of the increase in the provision of mandated benefits –although 
the increase in labor supply in the formal sector is not enough to compensate for the increase in 
demand resulting in an increase in formal wages. Among women, there is a reduction in the 
demand for both formal and informal wage employees, and a decline in formal and informal 
wages (although not significant for formal wages). Laid-off women move to informal firms 
where they obtain a job without mandated benefits. Some self-employed women become 
informal wage employees, probably attracted by the probability of obtaining better employment 
conditions in the future. The heterogenous impacts of a higher level of enforcement are 
explained by labor regulations which vary by gender in some cases, e.g., maternity leave, or have 
a different impact on firms’ costs due to different men and women characteristics, e.g., 
contributions to the pension system which are a function of monthly labor earnings. Labor 
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regulations make formal and informal men more substitutable in the production process than 
formal and informal women.  
A general pattern of higher compliance with labor regulation as a result of higher 
enforcement (with no distinction between men and women) was also reported by Ronconi (2010) 
for Argentina, Almeida and Carneiro (2012) and Almeida et al. (2013) for Brazil. Almeida and 
Carneiro (2012) also report a decline in informal employment and a reduction in formal wages 
that the authors interpret as a price formal workers pay for more generous benefits. In terms of 
the theoretical mechanisms discussed in this paper, the increase in formal employment and 
reduction in informal employment would be explained by a substitution effect that offsets the 
scale effect, and the reduction in formal wages would be the result of self-employed workers 
looking for formal wage jobs which are now more attractive. 
These empirical findings have important policy implications in terms of gender equality in 
the labor market. A higher degree of enforcement improves male working conditions but has the 
unintended effect of driving women into the informal sector of the economy. This type of 
leakages should be considered when designing labor regulations and deciding about labor 
inspections to avoid offsetting the intended effect of labor rules and the labor inspection system, 
i.e., to increase the share of all workers receiving labor benefits. 
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Figure 1 
Percentage of compliance with social security and employment benefits by gender. Wage employees. 
1992-2015 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on SEDLAC (2017). 
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Figure 2 
Description of the labor inspection system 
2005-2011 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social. 
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Figure 3 
Annual changes in the enforcement measure across provinces and sectors  
 
 
 Source: Own elaboration based on Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social and EPH-C. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics.  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: Sample averages and standard deviations between parentheses. The sample includes female and male wage 
employees aged 15-60 and 15-65 respectively, employed in private firms in sectors targeted by the inspection 
system. Variables are defined in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
 
  
Women Men Women Men
Age 35.84 36.16 Employed on large-size firms (%) 47.54 47.33
(11.03) (12.09) (49.94) (49.929)
Years of education 12.96 10.77 Employed in agriculture (%) 0.62 1.96
(3.3) (3.67) (7.83) (13.86)
Social security regulations coverage (%) 69.28 62.32 Employed in manufacturing sector (%) 12.29 22.55
(46.13) (48.46) (32.83) (41.79)
Employment regulations coverage (%) 48.09 35.77 Employed in services sector (%) 87.09 75.49
(49.96) (47.93) (33.53) (43.01)
Receives free meals (%) 15.45 16.30 Formal hourly wage 7.66 7.08
(36.14) (36.94) (5.76) (6.94)
Receives housing (%) 0.39 1.58 Informal hourly wage 4.45 4.05
(6.26) (12.48) (4.99) (4.98)
Receives products (%) 2.23 2.69 Formal monthly earnings 1,093 1,291
(14.76) (16.17) (658) (1058)
Employed on small-size firms (%) 20.34 23.89 Informal monthly earnings 537 669
(40.25) (42.64) (509) (615)
Employed on medium-size firms (%) 32.12 28.78
(46.69) (45.28) Number of observations 83,906 148,166
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Table 2 
Arrival costs of labor inspectors and enforcement of labor regulations  
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: OLS estimations. Standard errors clustered at the province-sector level in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Individual characteristics include age and age squared, indicators for 
educational level, marital status and size of the firm, and number of children at home. Political business cycle 
variables include logarithm of social per capita expenditure and primary result as a percentage of total incomes. 
Quality of institutions includes logarithm of absenteeism rate in provincial elections. Development level variables 
include logarithm of the population, logarithm of the per capita household income, and unsatisfied basic needs 
poverty indicator. Demand shocks includes logarithm of building permits per capita. 
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(arrival cost)*shr04 -0.856 -0.863 -0.867 -0.661 -0.671 -0.672
[0.271]*** [0.270]*** [0.269]*** [0.317]** [0.314]** [0.313]**
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development level variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-time trends No No Yes No No Yes
F statistic 9.95 10.22 10.40 8.72 9.12 9.22
p-value of underid. test 0.0016 0.0014 0.0012 0.01815 0.0161 0.0157
Observations 148,166 148,166 148,166 83,906 83,906 83,906
R2 0.686 0.688 0.697 0.715 0.721 0.732
Log(enforcement measure)
Men Women
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Table 3 
Enforcement of labor regulations and compliance with mandated benefits  
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: OLS and IV estimations. Standard errors clustered at the province-sector level in brackets. *** significant at 
1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Control variables defined as in Table 2. 
 
  
Dependent variable:
IV OLS IV OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men
Log(enforcement measure) 0.103 0.0103 0.0649 0.00578
[0.0343]*** [0.00968] [0.0254]** [0.00707]
Observations 148,166 148,166 148,166 148,166
R2 0.277 0.286 0.164 0.168
Women 0 0 0 0
Log(enforcement measure) -0.167 -0.00486 -0.138 0.00528
[0.0963]* [0.0131] [0.0784]* [0.0108]
Observations 83,906 83,906 83,906 83,906
R2 0.218 0.253 0.210 0.233
Included controls:
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social security benefits Employment benefits
=1 if wage employee receives 
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Table 4 
Enforcement of labor regulations and compliance with mandated benefits by marital status 
  
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: IV estimations. Standard errors clustered at the province-sector level in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Control variables defined as in Table 2. 
 
 
  
Dependent variable:
Married Unmarried Married Unmarried
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Men
Log(enforcement measure) 0.125 0.0565 0.0631 0.0620
[0.0388]*** [0.0246]** [0.0226]*** [0.0303]**
Observations 93,037 55,129 93,037 55,129
R2 0.230 0.305 0.146 0.199
Women
Log(enforcement measure) -0.227 -0.139 -0.190 -0.117
[0.126]* [0.0987] [0.104]* [0.0804]
Observations 42,278 41,628 42,278 41,628
R2 0.183 0.232 0.188 0.203
Included controls:
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
=1 if wage employee receives 
Social security benefits Employment benefits
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Table 5 
Enforcement of labor regulations and logarithm of hourly wages and percentiles of the distribution of the 
logarithm of hourly wages 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: IV estimations. Standard errors clustered at the province-sector level in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Control variables defined as in Table 2. 
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable:
Average 10th 50th 90th Average 10th 50th 90th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Men
Log(enforcement measure) 0.0465 0.0279 0.0126 0.0300 -0.0385 -0.0163 -0.0282 -0.0315
[0.0218]** [0.0102]*** [0.00623]** [0.0117]** [0.0461] [0.0131] [0.0150]* [0.0118]***
Observations 91,231 91,231 91,231 91,231 56,935 56,935 56,935 56,935
R2 0.302 0.718 0.864 0.768 0.229 0.810 0.858 0.820
Women 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Log(enforcement measure) -0.0844 -0.146 -0.115 -0.149 -0.252 -0.249 -0.175 -0.296
[0.0927] [0.126] [0.134] [0.172] [0.120]** [0.181] [0.0842]** [0.184]
Observations 59,919 59,919 59,919 59,919 23,987 23,987 23,987 23,987
R2 0.341 0.650 0.835 0.685 0.220 0.773 0.809 0.692
Included controls:
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Formal wage employees Informal wage employees
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Table 6 
Enforcement of labor regulations and provision of non-mandated benefits 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: IV estimations. Standard errors clustered at the province-sector level in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Control variables defined as in Table 2. 
  
Dependent variable: Free meals Housing Products
(1) (2) (3)
Men
Log(enforcement measure) -0.00140 0.0328 -0.00295
[0.0193] [0.0237] [0.00465]
Observations 148,166 148,166 148,166
R2 0.122 0.045 0.018
Women 0 0 0
Log(enforcement measure) 0.0178 0.00616 -0.000505
[0.0298] [0.00425] [0.0101]
Observations 83,906 83,906 83,906
R2 0.141 0.010 0.027
Included controls:
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes Yes
Development level variables Yes Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Province-time trends Yes Yes Yes
=1 if wage employee receives 
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Table 7 
Enforcement of labor regulations and employment composition 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: IV estimations. Omitted category: self-employment. Standard errors clustered at the province-sector level in 
brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Control variables defined as in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Dependent variable:
Wage 
employee
Formal wage 
employee
Informal wage 
employee
(1) (2) (3)
Men
Log(enforcement measure) 0.0469 0.0646 0.0487
[0.0242]* [0.0312]** [0.0271]*
Observations 202,277 143,956 109,831
R2 0.457 0.725 0.423
Women
Log(enforcement measure) 0.0415 -0.0303 0.162
[0.0280] [0.0391] [0.0678]**
Observations 109,461 84,702 48,832
R2 0.472 0.694 0.442
Included controls:
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes Yes
Development level variables Yes Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Province-time trends Yes Yes Yes
=1 if workers is
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Table 8 
Relocation decisions of firms 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: IV estimations. Omitted category in columns 7-9: self-employment. Standard errors clustered at the province-
sector level in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Control variables defined 
as in Table 2. 
 
  
Dependent variable:
Wage Formal wage Informal wage 
employee employee employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9)
Men
Log(enforcement measure) 0.103 0.0649 0.0465 -0.0388 0.0470 0.0647 0.0488
[0.0342]*** [0.0254]** [0.0211]** [0.0466] [0.0242]* [0.0313]** [0.0271]*
Observations 148,166 148,166 91,231 56,935 202,277 143,956 109,831
R2 0.277 0.164 0.302 0.229 0.457 0.725 0.423
Women 0 0
Log(enforcement measure) -0.165 -0.138 -0.0841 -0.256 0.0384 -0.0310 0.178
[0.0950]* [0.0778]* [0.0870] [0.122]** [0.0260] [0.0396] [0.0756]**
Observations 83,906 83,906 59,919 23,987 109,461 84,702 48,832
R2 0.224 0.212 0.337 0.217 0.470 0.693 0.434
Included controls:
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Oil prices Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
=1 if worker is=1 if social 
sec. benefits
=1 if emp. 
benefits
Log of hourly 
formal    
wages
Log of hourly 
informal 
wages
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Table 9 
Number of labor inspection agencies in each province 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: IV estimations. Omitted category in columns 7-9: self-employment. Standard errors clustered at the province-
sector level in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Control variables defined 
as in Table 2. 
Dependent variable:
Wage Formal wage Informal wage 
employee employee employee
(1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9)
Men
Log(enforcement measure) 0.107 0.0704 0.0437 -0.0356 0.0529 0.0675 0.0573
[0.0362]*** [0.0267]*** [0.0224]* [0.0441] [0.0261]** [0.0321]** [0.0297]*
Observations 148,166 148,166 91,231 56,935 202,277 143,956 109,831
R2 0.276 0.163 0.302 0.229 0.456 0.725 0.422
Women 0 0
Log(enforcement measure) -0.146 -0.118 -0.0615 -0.264 0.0527 -0.0148 0.186
[0.0748]* [0.0603]* [0.0654] [0.121]** [0.0282]* [0.0289] [0.0745]**
Observations 83,906 83,906 59,919 23,987 109,461 84,702 48,832
R2 0.231 0.219 0.340 0.216 0.469 0.694 0.433
Included controls:
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
=1 if social 
sec. benefits
=1 if emp. 
benefits
Log of hourly 
formal    
wages
Log of hourly 
informal 
wages
=1 if worker is
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Table 10 
Composition of employment by economic sector 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: IV estimations. Omitted category in columns 7-9: self-employment. Standard errors clustered at the province-
sector level in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Control variables defined 
as in Table 2.  
 
  
=1 if social sec. =1 if emp.
Dependent variable: benefits benefits
(1) (2)
Women 0 0
Log(enforcement measure) -0.120 -0.117
[0.0405]*** [0.0345]***
Observations 83,906 83,906
R2 0.237 0.207
Included controls:
Individual characteristics Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes
Development level variables Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Province-time trends Yes Yes
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Appendix  
 
Table A1 
Variables definition and sources of data 
 Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Variables Definition
Social security regulations
Employment regulations
Non-mandated benefits
Hourly wage and monthly labor 
income
Percentiles of the wage distribution
Employment categories
Enforcement measure
Arrival cost of labor inspectors
Educational levels
Firm size
Economic sectors
Social expenditure
Primary result
Absenteeism 
Edification permits
Oil prices
Set of two indicator variables for whether the worker is a salaried employee or is self-
employed. Source: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
Indicator variable for whether the worker receives contributions to the pension system 
and the health insurance system. Source: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
Indicator variable for whether the worker receives paid vacations, annual extra monthly 
wage, paid sick days, earns the minimum wage or more, and works no more than the 
legislated maximum of weekly hours. Source: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
Set of three indicator variables for whether the worker receives meals at work, receives 
housing, or receives free products. Source: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the distribution of the logarithm of hourly wages 
calculated at the province, sector, and year level. Source: Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares.
Hourly wage and monthly labor income in main occupation in local currency at 2005 
prices. Source: Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
Total incomes minus primary expenditures as a percentage of total incomes for each 
province and year. Source: Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las 
Provincias.
Logarithm of the percentage of absent voters in provincial elections in year t and 
replicates the same value until a new election was performed. In most provinces 
elections were carried out in 2003, 2007 and 2011. Source: Ministerio del Interior y 
Transporte.
Logarithm of edification permits measured in squared kilometers and normalized by 
the total population in each province and year. Sources: Dirección Nacional de 
Coordinación Fiscal con las Provincias and INDEC.
Average retail price of different fuels and oil types (gasoil, compressed natural gas, 
fuels) in all gas stations in each province and year. Source: Secretaria de Energía.  
Logarithm of the ratio between the number of inspected firms and the total number of 
formal firms in each province, sector and year. Source: MTEySS.
Logarithm of extension of the road network in each province and year multiplied by the 
number of crossing vehicles in each province and year. The road network is normalized 
by the territory of each province and the number of crossing vehicles is expressed in a 
per capita basis. The logarithm is multiplied by the share of each sector in the total 
gross production value in 2004. Sources: INDEC, Consejo Vial Federal, and 
Asociación Argentina de Carreteras.
Skilled workers: complete college education; Semi-skilled: complete secondary 
education or incomplete college education; Unskilled: incomplete secondary education 
or lower.
Small size: 5 employees or less; Medium size: 6 to 40 employees; Large size: 41 
employees or more.
1=Agriculture, animal production, hunting, forestry, and fishing; 2=Mining and quarrying; 
3=Manufacturing; 4=Electricity, gas and water supply; 5=Construction; 6=Wholesale 
and retail trade, and real estate activities; 7=Accommodation and food service activities; 
8=Transportation and storage, communication, and financial intermediation; 
9=Education; 10=Human health and social work activities, and personal services. 
Logarithm of social expenditure expressed in a per capita basis at 2005 prices for each 
province and year. Source: Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con las 
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Table A2 
Enforcement of labor regulations and compliance with social security and employment regulations one by 
one 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: IV estimations. Standard errors clustered at the province-sector level in brackets. *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. Control variables defined as in Table 2. 
 
 
 
  
Dependent variable:
Pension 
contributions
Health 
insurance 
contributions
Paid 
vacation 
time
Minimum 
wage
Annual extra 
wage
Paid 
sickdays
Max weekly 
hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Men
Log(enforcement measure) 0.103 0.104 0.0987 0.0625 0.102 0.108 -0.0151
[0.0346]*** [0.0340]*** [0.0351]*** [0.0181]*** [0.0352]*** [0.0371]*** [0.0332]
Observations 148,166 148,166 148,166 148,166 148,166 148,166 148,166
R2 0.279 0.279 0.270 0.246 0.271 0.271 0.065
Women 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Log(enforcement measure) -0.175 -0.169 -0.164 -0.102 -0.170 -0.174 -0.0820
[0.100]* [0.0945]* [0.0928]* [0.0594]* [0.0968]* [0.0951]* [0.0443]*
Observations 83,906 83,906 83,906 83,906 83,906 83,906 83,906
R2 0.215 0.217 0.183 0.232 0.184 0.188 0.039
Included controls:
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
=1 if wage employee receives
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Table A3 
Arrival cost of labor inspectors and enforcement of labor regulations  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
Notes: OLS estimations. Columns 1 and 3 show the first stage when testing for relocation decisions of firms. 
Columns 2 and 4 show the first stage when changing the definition of the instrument. Column 5 shows the first stage 
when re-weighting the sample of women. Standard errors clustered at the province-sector level in brackets. *** 
significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(arrival cost)*shr04 -0.867 -0.515 -0.672 -0.453 -0.974
[0.269]*** [0.167]*** [0.313]** [0.180]** [0.244]***
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political business cycle variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quality of institutions variable Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Development level variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demand shocks variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F statistic 10.40 9.46 9.20 12.62 16.00
p-value of underid. test 0.0012 0.0020 0.0158 0.0059 0.0001
Observations 148,166 148,166 83,906 83,906 83,906
R2 0.697 0.695 0.733 0.737 0.708
Men
Log(enforcement measure)
Women
